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ABSTRACT: In this paper we present a case study of the impoverished ornamental fishing situation in 
the Inirida Fluvial Confluence (IFC) in Colombia. For this purpose fieldwork was conducted to obtain 
primary data from fishermen in the zone. The results indicate that effort applied to create different 
economic activities have no significant impact on the income of fishermen. Community Agreements for 
Responsible Fishing (CARF) could be an effective policy for management of the resource; nevertheless, 
their establishment can bring a loss of livelihoods when there are no clear alternative income sources, 
and may be incompatible with poverty alleviation objectives. Due to this, alternative sources of income 
should also be promoted in policy-making.
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La falta de fuentes de ingresos alternativos: el caso de la pesca ornamental 
en la Estrella Fluvial de Inírida, Amazonas Colombiano
RESUMEN: En este documento se presenta el caso del empobrecimiento de la pesca ornamental en la 
Estrella Fluvial de Inirida (EFI) en Colombia. Para esto, se realizó un trabajo de campo con el fin de obte-
ner información primaria de los pescadores de la zona. Los resultados indican que el esfuerzo aplicado a 
diferentes actividades económicas no tiene relación significativa con los ingresos de los pescadores. Los 
Acuerdos Comunitarios para la Pesca Responsable podrían ser una política efectiva para el manejo del 
recurso; sin embargo su establecimiento podría ocasionar una pérdida de medios de subsistencia cuando no 
hay fuentes certeras de ingresos alternativos, lo que puede ser incompatible con la mitigación de la pobreza. 
Por esto deberían promoverse también las fuentes alternativas de ingresos en la elaboración de política.
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1. Introduction 
Although the problematic of deterioration affects both marine and inland 
fisheries, the main efforts for their protection have been focused on the former (Allan 
et al., 2005).
In the case of small-scale fisheries, this problematic is no doubt complex. On the 
one hand, some authors state that main reasons for degradation of fishing resource 
are caused by the open access, common property nature of the fisheries (Hardin, 
1968; Pearce, 1982; Copes, 1989), and the seeking of rent-maximizing equilibrium 
for offsetting opportunity costs and investments (Gordon, 1954). As a consequence, 
rent dissipation is common and the fishermen fall into a poverty trap caused by com-
petition.
On the other hand, some authors state that degradation of resources in small-scale 
fisheries is caused by the lack of opportunities for obtaining direct incomes from al-
ternative economic activities (Anderson 1980; Smith 1979; Smith, 1981; Panayatou, 
1988; Cunningham, 1993). Particularly in developing countries, small-scale fisheries 
are usually located in rural remote areas, with very few alternative employment op-
portunities (Smith, 1979; Panayotou, 1988). Due to this, fishing could be the only 
economic activity for providing income and food to local populations (Bailey and 
Jentoft, 1990). In any case, there is a global consensus, that the status of fish stocks is 
worsening rather than improving and catch weights are declining despite the increase 
in total fishing effort (FAO, 2014). 
In the case of Amazon inland fisheries, Sirén (2006) indicates that these different 
causes for explaining the resource degradation are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
and instead may interact with each other. Besides these causes, some other pressures 
can also be attributed such as the market, new fishing gear, and the destruction of 
aquatic ecosystems (Smith, 1985; Pinedo and Soria, 2008). Despite the high pro-
ductivity of Amazonian fisheries, their scarcity periods are more frequent every day 
(Castro and McGrath, 2010).
This research focuses on the components that define the income of inhabitants of 
Inirida Fluvial Confluence (IFC) located in the Colombian Amazon. For this purpose, 
the hypothesis that the population relies on small-scale inland ornamental fishing1 due 
to lack of more profitable alternatives is adopted (Smith, 1979). Failure to diversify 
economic activities to secure their livelihoods is assumed (Vedeld et al., 2012)2.
For developing this analysis, we test whether alternative livelihood sources gener-
ate significant income for local inhabitants and identify whether mechanisms for pro-
1 According to FAO (2014) ornamental fishing and aquaculture species can be considered as ones captured 
and kept alive for decorative and pet purpose. Zuluaga and Franco-Jaramillo (2014) based on the United Na-
tions Commodity Trade Statistics Database estimate that the world value of exported decorative fish was USD 
142,734,000 million during 2012. According to Ajiaco-Martínez et al. (2012), South Asian countries are the 
main providers with 85 % of the market share, whereas the remaining 15 % is distributed between Brazil, Co-
lombia and Peru.
2 Particularly Vedeld et al. (2012) state that households tend to diversify their sources of income when options 
outside their main agricultural activities (i.e. fishing) are more profitable.
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tecting the resource are found outside the fishing sector by creating alternative or sup-
plementary livelihood sources (Kooiman, et al., 2005; Allison and Horemans 2006). 
This research attempts to provide a contribution to the literature regarding the 
activity of inland ornamental fishing, thus reducing the absence of scientific evidence 
and generating input for enhancing institutional response in the zone3. The remainder 
of this document contains section 2 where the context of the fishermen population in 
IFC is explained. Section 3 presents a theoretical model for explaining the behavior 
of fishermen. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and findings. Finally, in sec-
tion 5 some conclusions and final remarks are made.
2. Context of case study
This section presents the population on whom this research is conducted, and for 
whom it is proposed to apply the Community Agreements for Responsible Fishing4. 
This section provides a broad insight of the social and economic characteristics of 
the studied communities based on primary sources of information and experiences 
collected and published by Zuluaga and Franco-Jaramillo (2013) and Zuluaga and 
Franco-Jaramillo (2014) during their research in these communities. This research 
was carried out in the indigenous communities of Yuri, Santa Rosa, La Ceiba and 
Almidon, located in Inirida’s rivera, and Playa Blanca located in Atabapo’s rivera. 
These communities belong to the IFC of Orinoco hydrographical basin, and to the 
municipalities of Inirida in the department of Guainia, and Cumaribo in the depart-
ment of Vichada. These two departments are located in the northeast Amazon, along 
the frontier between Colombia and Venezuela.
2.1. Economic activities5
According to Agudelo et al. (2011), in the Colombian Amazon, 52 % of the re-
gional production of fish is based on small-scale artisanal fishing. On the one hand, 
335 of captured species are considered ornamental, and represent 50 % of this com-
modity exported from Colombia (Ramírez-Gil and Ajiaco-Martínez, 2001)6. During 
2005, royalties from the exportation of these species were estimated at around USD 
$7,000,000 (INCODER, 2008; in Mancera-Rodríguez and Álvarez-León, 2008). 
3 According to Ajiaco-Martínez et al. (2012), for this activity there is an absence of scientific evidence regarding 
the biology of species and many institutional deficiencies that foster difficulties for controlling and monitoring 
the users of the resource.
4 Section 2.2 explains the definition and basis of these Community Agreements for Responsible Fishing.
5 Due to the importance the economical, ecosystem and biodiversity, the IFC has been declared as objective for 
wetland protection since 2004 (Londoño-Calle, 2012). In July 8, 2014 the IFC was declared Ramsar wetland of 
international importance. Thus, the IFC becomes the sixth Ramsar site in Colombia and the first in the Orinoco-
Amazon region in South America.
6 Zúñiga (2010; in Zuluaga and Franco-Jaramillo, 2014) argues that 90 % of this resource is harvested directly 
from their natural stock and are mostly managed by indigenous communities in the Amazon.
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However, this practice faces a progressive decrease due to overfishing among other 
causes (Zuluaga and Franco-Jaramillo, 2014), although users’ perception recognizes 
no such decrease (Ajiaco-Martínez et al., 2012). Moreover, according to local in-
habitants and researchers in the zone, the prices of this commodity have remained 
constant over the past 10 years due to the bargaining power of local buyers. On the 
other hand, 132 species are destined for local consumption or marketed inside the 
communities (Lasso et al., 2010).
MAP 1
Inirida Fluvial Confluence
Source: Geographical Institute Agustin Codazzi (2011).
Other economic activities are performed such as small-scale agricultural harvest-
ing of land crops called Conucos; non-timber fiber processing and manufacturing; 
and gold mining in some communities. The latter activity is poorly documented due 
to political and environmental problems involved, thus locals recognize it as profit-
able, but infrequent.
Ramírez-Gil and Ajiaco-Martínez (2001) estimated that there were 194 fisher-
men in the IFC. For 2010, the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) estimated an ap-
proximate number of fishermen in these communities which has been summarized 
in Table 1 below:
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TABLE 1
Population of fishermen in study zone
Community Families Approximate count of fishermen Distance to Urban Zone (Km)
Almidon 8 16 6.20
Santa Rosa 12 40 25.13
La Ceiba 28 28 26.91
Yurí 83 180 36.04
Playa Blanca* 16 15 -
* The accurate distance of Playa Blanca to urban zone is not available; nevertheless, locals consider this 
community as the furthest from urban municipality.
Source: WWF Colombia (2010).
2.2. Community Agreements for Responsible Fishing
The creation of the Community Agreements for Responsible Fishing (CARF) has 
been motivated for controlling the increasing human pressure and market demand for 
fish, which threatens the biodiversity of the IFC and compromises the local food se-
curity, nutrition, and equitable development of the local people. CARFs are based on 
the model proposed by Conservation International (2007), promoted by the National 
Authority for Aquaculture and Fisheries (AUNAP for its acronymin Spanish) of the 
Ministry of Agriculture of Colombia and executed by WWF. They began their for-
mulation in 2012 by identifying different fishing sites, objective species, and socio-
economic implications/effects of the fishery. 
In a broad sense, the CARF aims at the regulation of fishing gear and intensity 
of effort, delimitation of territory and access to fishing areas. Basically a CARF 
will limit access to prior natural capital for obtaining livelihoods in communities 
located in IFC. Then, local communities will receive little income, but substantial 
costs related to resource access restrictions. However, because CARFs are yet not 
applied there is no clear understanding of their overall impact and how the impacts 
differ in different contexts, at individual or household levels; i.e. perceiving whether 
protection is effective by imposing legal constraints rather than offering economic 
opportunities (Shemweta and Kideghesho, 2000). Therefore, the evaluation of CARF 
impacts on livelihoods is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
There have been relatively few studies that evaluate the impacts of programs aim-
ing at creating protected areas and conservation incentives on livelihoods (Thapa, 
2013). Nevertheless, their findings show that they are believed to play an important 
role in the alleviation of poverty by supplying ecosystem services, developing eco-
tourism, and providing conservation benefits for social and economic development 
(Fortin and Gagnon, 1999; Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011); 
However, these benefits have not been found to offset the costs involved by the crea-
tion of protected areas (West et al., 2006), and their establishment also brings adverse 
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effects on neighboring communities mainly through displacement, a reduction in 
food security, and a loss of livelihoods (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004; 
Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006)7.
Therefore, it has been argued that local impacts of establishing resource protec-
tion policies can lead to sub-optimal results, especially when faced with a limited set 
of opportunities for obtaining additional incomes, which should also be targets for 
governance reform. Due to this, small-scale fisheries management is also about creat-
ing opportunities instead of merely solving problems (Kooiman et al., 2005; Allison 
and Horemans, 2006). In consequence, any agreement should contain governance 
reform aiming at providing small-scale fishermen with a set of opportunities and 
capabilities to improve their livelihoods and diversify them in order to utilize their 
household assets more fully, thus enhancing the possibilities for development (Ve-
deld et al., 2012). 
3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Determination of fishermen’s income
This analysis is based on the theoretical model proposed by Anderson (1980) with 
a slight modification, which does not alter the main conclusions. First, lets assume 
that all the arguments that define the income of a fisherman are expressed in terms of 
the income received by ornamental fishing IO and a supplementary activity IA, which 
in the case of IFC are commercial activities such as selling agriculture products, non-
timber manufactures, and fish-food marketing.
[1]
In this model, incomes depend on the effort applied to the activity plus the 
opportunity that incomes involve, expressed as a psychic return to the activity 
defined as worker satisfaction bonus (WSB). Assuming an open-access equilibrium 
in a two-activity model, the net real income is equal in both industries [2].
[2]
In this case, there will be no incentive for agents to change activities [2]. Fur-
thermore as Anderson (1980) states, as WSB seems to be less variable than monetary 
incomes, it is probably the latter that drives the fishery to equilibrium. Then, the rea-
son for explaining why fishermen remain in the activity is because fishing provides 
7 A closer experience in La Pedrera, located in the Colombian Amazon shows that conservation agreements ap-
plied during 2007 ensured the recovery of the fishing resource during 2009 to 2010 (Mora et al., 2010). Although 
communities involved in the program experienced a decline in revenue due to the implementation of these agree-
ments (Moreno-Arias and Moreno-Arias, 2010).
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a total net income higher than the other activities due to a rent earned from the fish 
stock [3].
[3]
In the contrary case, it can be assumed that fisherman will leave the fishing 
activity and reduce the pressure on the resource [4].
[4]
As a final remark, Anderson (1980) concludes that optimal management of the 
fishery can increase net fishing income, but it seems to be based on a confusion of 
wealth and income effects.
3.2. Sustainable livelihoods and diversification
According to Ellis (2000), livelihood diversification is a phenomenon that charac-
terizes rural household survival strategies. The author argues that livelihood diversifi-
cation should be considered as an objective for long term policy making for reducing 
poverty in low income economies, and not as merely a transient phenomenon reflect-
ing disequilibrium in labor markets in the process of development thus ensuring the 
survival of rural economies and reducing the vulnerability of peoples’ livelihoods. 
Different motivations for livelihood diversification are seasonality, risk, labor 
markets, credit markets, asset strategies, and coping behavior (Ellis, 2000). These de-
terminants are mediated through social relations and institutions, and shaped by inter-
actions with the physical environment, and by changes in the economy over time due 
to liberalization policies. Thereby the role of diversification in reducing the intensity 
of poverty promotes a process of continuous adaptation for avoiding labor market 
failures and for attaining a better income distribution in rural economies. 
As a conclusion, Ellis (2000) argues that having diverse alternatives income 
sources can make the difference between sustainable livelihoods and extreme poverty.
4. Empirical analysis
This section presents the analysis of the data collected during August 2014. The 
information is obtained from 45 male fishermen through a semi-structured survey. 
This section also presents a brief descriptive analysis of the information and the 
statistical estimations.
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4.1. The Data
This sample takes into account only artisanal ornamental fishermen from 5 com-
munities located inside the IFC. These fishermen also perform alternative activities 
for obtaining income. 
TABLE 2
Sample of fishermen
Community Fishermen Average size of household
Almidon 8 6.0
Santa Rosa 12 3.6
La Ceiba 8 6.4
Yuri 14 4.4
Playa Blanca 3 5.3
Total 45 5.14
Source: Own elaboration.
The survey collected data related to average weekly income from ornamental 
fish sales, commercializing fish-food and non-timber manufactures, and working for 
other employers. The latter activity entails full or part time waged-occupations that 
provide income by selling labor inside or outside the communities. Data regarding 
the weekly hours destined to different activities were also obtained8.
TABLE 3
Economic activities of sample fishermen
Activity Average weekly income ($)
Average weekly 
hours
Principal 
activity
Supplementary 
activity
Ornamental Fishing 127,200 49.86 32 13
Fish-food 75,000 37.06 1 10
Conucos 37,500 33.68 12 16
Non-timber manufactures 25,000 43.5 - 4
Working for other 75,000 40 - 2
Full-income 231.000 - - -
1 The exchange rate by the date for dollar was 1,880 COP/USD. For euro was 2,450 COP/€.
Source: Own elaboration.
8 Previous interviews, focus groups, and communication with local leaders in the zone were performed before 
conducting the survey.
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Data collected also contains information about mobilization, indicating whether 
the fisherman powers the boat using oars or an outboard motor. The variable ‘tv own-
ership’ indicates the richest households. The variable ow indicates whether fishermen 
are owner-operators of their vessels, then distinguishing between returns of labor 
and capital. Cunningham (1993) states that if a fisherman is capitalist rather than a 
laborer, he finds it difficult to leave the fishery. Regarding the education of fisher-
men, it is observed that everyone has some level of schooling. Variable dhs indicates 
whether a fisherman has attended any level of high schooling9. Particularly in this 
zone, the schooling coverage in every community is up to 5 grades of elementary 
school. In order to continue with formal education, inhabitants of the communities 
have to travel up to the urban area of the municipality of Inirida. For this purpose 
they have to travel by water transport, which entails a high cost. This is one reason of 
the high abandonment of high school by fishermen. Information about family compo-
sition was also collected; the variable cs indicates whether a fisherman is married or 
not. This variable indicates when fisherman is the head of household. Finally, fpa in-
dicates when fishing is the principal activity of the fisherman. This variable contains 
information about self-recognition in the activity, and most important, this variable 
tries to obtain information about the bargaining power of the fishermen when faced 
with the local buyers. Table 4 summarizes this information.
TABLE 4
Socio-economic characteristics of sample
Variable Definition Quantity Percentage of sample (%)
tv Television ownership 25  55.56
r Row mobilization 32 71.11
ow Vessel ownership 34 75.56
dhs High-schooled fishermen 24 53.33
cs Civil status 36 80.00
fpa Fishing as principal activity 32 71.11
Source: Own elaboration.
4.2. Estimations
In order to measure the relation between the effort and the average income of 
the livelihood of a fisherman, an OLS model was estimated with the information 
obtained from the survey. This estimation considers the weekly average income ob-
tained from fishing and alternative activities as a dependent variable. As independent 
variables, it considers f as the weekly hours exclusively applied to ornamental fishing 
9 Formal elementary schooling in Colombia takes 5 years. High schooling takes 6 years. Technician tertiary 
schooling entails up to 3 years of schooling. Tertiary professional is up to 5 years for obtaining a Bachelor Diploma.
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and oa as the weekly hours applied to commercializing alternative commodities, fish-
food included. These weekly hours also contain the time for traveling to the urban 
market in Inirida. Additionally, some other variables are taken into account such as 
rowing for transport r, which takes the value of 1 if a fisherman moves using row-
ing, 0 if using an outboard motor. The ownership of vessel is indicated by the vari-
able ow, which takes the value of 1 if a fisherman owns the vessel, 0 otherwise. The 
variable dhs defines the schooling of fishermen; this variable takes the value of 1 if a 
fisherman has received any kind of secondary schooling, 0 otherwise. Civil status cs, 
which is a dummy variable, takes the value 1 if a fisherman is the head of household, 
0 otherwise. Dummy variable fpa takes the value 1 if fishing is a principal activity 
for the agent, 0 otherwise. Finally, controls for the activities ff, ch, nm, and w, and 
distance to urban market expressed by the communities sr, lc, y, and sr are applied to 
identify differences on income. These descriptors are presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Descriptors of income composition
Variable Descriptors Expected sign
f Weekly effort on fishing +
oa Weekly effort on other activities +
r Row boats (mode of transport) -
ow Vessel ownership +
dhs Some high-school experience +
cs Civil Status +
fpa Fishing as principal activity +
ff Fish-food -
ch Conucos -
nm Non-timber manufactures -
w Working for others -
sr Santa Rosa -
lc La Ceiba -
y Yuri -
pb Playa Blanca -
Constant  +
Source: Own elaboration.
Descriptors such as sr, lc, y, and pb are presumed to exhibit lower incomes com-
pared to Almidon due to those fishermen living in Santa Rosa, La Ceiba, Yuri, and 
Playa Blanca which are further from urban market buyers and subject to local buyers 
with greater bargaining power. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 6.
The lack of alternative income sources: The case of ornamental fishing... 91
TABLE 6
Income composition in IFC
Variable Description Coefficient
f Weekly effort on fishing -831.99 (929.01)
oa Weekly effort on other activities -682.19 (804.81)
r Row boats -48836.43** (23590.04)
ow Vessel ownership 37571.8* (21551.61)
dhs High-schooled Fishermen 34059.37** (16697.51)
cs Civil Status 36951.73** (18310.22)
fpa Fishing as principal activity 51612.44** (25431.5)
ff Fish-food -21608.16 (55641.45)
ch Conucos -626.49 (52079.14)
nm Non-timber manufactures -1932.45 (63226.39)
w Working for others 34988.72 (54672.89)
sr Santa Rosa 8812.15 (28923.09)
lc La Ceiba 22645.15 (20018.72)
y Yuri -30448.32 (21971.93)
pb Playa Blanca -6395.41 (32601.53)
Constant  97986.61** (47156.81)
a Weekly income i as independent variable. R2=0.3132, F=0, n=90. Test regarding normality exhibits no statis-
tical evidence to reject the normality of errors. Problems of heterosckedasticty are corrected in the estimation. 
Tests are presented in the Appendix.
*Significance at 10 %. **Significance at 5 %. ***Significance at 1 %.
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 6 shows that neither f nor oa exhibit significant statistical relationship to the 
income of fishermen10. One of the reasons for explaining the non-statistical relation-
ship between the income and the effort applied to fishing is the dynamic of distribu-
tion. The fishermen are paid once the commodity arrives at the final buyer having no 
control over the supply chain and the species that arrive alive; thus facing the total 
mortality of the commodity11. Moreover, the different activities represented by ff, ch, 
nm, and w, provide non-statistically significant higher incomes than ornamental fish-
ing in IFC12.
10 In order to deal with the analysis of the effect of effort on performance in terms of income, interactions within 
variables such as f*ow and oa*ow were estimated, though they are non-statistically significant.
11 The estimation of mortality is 2.2 % in capturing, 1.7 % during community buying, and 1,2 % to urban buyers. 
Nevertheless, this mortality varies from 0,7 % up to 16 % depending on species and season (Ramírez-Gil and 
Ajiaco-Martínez, 2001). 
12 Inhabitants declare that trading manufactured and agricultural products, and other related activities do not 
provide enough income to inhabitants of IFC communities. 
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This result presents some evidence to consider that IFC households rely on fish-
ing due to lack of more profitable alternatives outside the fishing activity. According 
to authors such as Townsley (1998), Bailey and Jentoft (1990) and Panayotou (1988), 
fisheries constitute a last resort for rural households when there are few alternative 
sources of income, or access to other economic activities. As a consequence they are 
often unlikely to subsist by other activities rather than fishing (Dunn, 1989). Besides, 
according to Payne (2000), MacKenzie (1979), Bailey (1988) and Cunningham 
(1993), both marine and inland small-scale fisheries tend to include non-skilled, 
poor, and landless people; thereby fishermen rely for their livelihood only on fishing, 
which is maintained as their principal activity (Bailey, 1988; Vedeld et al., 2012).
Regarding the non-significant difference between alternative activities income of 
fishermen, some possible explanations arise. According to Sachs and Warner (2001), 
full dependence on the natural resources tends to crowd out other economic activi-
ties that could promote economical growth. The authors define the situation as the 
Resource Curse, which is based on the criterion that a population dedicated to exploit 
natural capital tends to neglect other activities because the high original revenues 
obtained from exploitation. Table 3 shows that ornamental fishing provides, on aver-
age, almost twice the income than selling fish-food and working for other, which are 
activities with the higher income after ornamental fishing.
Results regarding the fishing technology indicate that those fishermen who power 
their boats by rowing have significantly lower incomes. In this case, it is assumed 
that those fishermen who have outboard motors can travel longer distances and find 
less exploited fishing zones, thereby capturing more fish. 
The ownership of the vessel indicates that those fishermen who perform the activ-
ity as capitalists rather than laborers have incentives to earn higher incomes to recom-
pense their opportunity costs. This is an important result considering that Panayotou 
(1982) argues that fishermen may continue fishing even if they earn far less than their 
opportunity costs. In this case, those who own a boat have an explicit opportunity for 
referencing whether the activity is profitable or not, thereby these owners perceive 
ornamental fishing as a business.
Furthermore, according to Copes (1989); Ikiara and Odink (2000); and Doulman 
(2004), the opportunity cost of fishing for most fishermen is very low, thereby the 
opportunity cost of other activities is relatively higher than fishing. In this way they 
rely less on other activities leaving them underdeveloped or for sporadic engage-
ment. It is also necessary to remark on the schooling of fishermen. It means, that 
despite 26 fishermen having received some kind of secondary school experience, 42 
out of 45 fishermen have not completed the ordinary basic schooling of 11 grades, 
and only 3 of them have a tertiary schooling. As an explanation it is presumed that 
due to schooling provided in the communities of IFC reaches only 5 grades, which 
means that as fishermen they have to travel to the urban zone of Inirida in order con-
tinue their schooling at a high opportunity cost; a high abandonment of schooling 
is plausible. Taken into account this abandonment, possible consequences are slow 
human capital accumulation, low skills formation, and lower specialization in techni-
cal activities. According to Gylfason (2001), populations involved in exploitation of 
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natural resources tend to have low schooling enrolment rates due to their reliance on 
the revenues from this activity. As a consequence, lower levels of growth and devel-
opment are present. This is linked to findings from Sachs and Warner (2001), where 
populations involved in natural resource exploitation face a curse. 
However, some explanations arise regarding the schooling of fishermen and why 
the more-schooled ones obtain higher incomes. Firstly, due to the isolation of fishing 
communities in IFC, more-schooled agents are not necessarily linked to alternative 
employment opportunities, although the concept of a quality of life effect promoted 
by educational achievement generally encourages them to obtain higher incomes 
(Smith, 1979). Secondly, the level of education of a fisherman is important to deter-
mine his opportunity cost and opportunities outside the fishing sector, respectively 
(Ikiara and Odink, 2000). Thereby, informational or educational power results in 
knowledge for obtaining better selling prices and sales alternatives (Smith, 1979). 
Thirdly, Gylfason (2001) argues that relying on natural resources brings risks. More-
over, the cost of collecting and processing information about the risks and returns for 
an asset might be lower for more educated individuals (Black et al., 2015), More-
schooled fishermen can perceive the risks associated with the full dependence on one 
resource, thereby being encouraged to obtain higher incomes in order to compensate 
for the risks involved in the primary activity. 
The coefficient of variable cs indicates that those fishermen who are head of 
household obtain higher incomes than those that are not head of household. In this 
case, it can be presumed that those fishermen who face obligations for supporting a 
family are encouraged to obtain higher incomes. Nevertheless this is an assumption 
that requires to be proved.
The variable fpa includes information about the know-how of the activity. 
Considering these results, it can be asserted that those fishermen who perform the 
activity as their principal one, are more frequent on it; thereby they ensure better 
methods for avoiding fish mortality due to better techniques or equipment, proximity 
to the local buyer, or just because they are experienced. Moreover, this result also can 
provide an approximation of the bargaining power of fishermen, because those who 
perform the activity more frequently can ensure better payments for the quality of 
their catch in terms of the health of the fish. 
Moreover, the estimations regarding fpa provide an insight into the WSB, which 
is an individual-level feeling that reflects if a fisherman’s needs are being met by the 
activity they perform. According to Pollnac and Poggie (2008), fishing is often more 
than just another occupation and most fishermen have a strong attachment to it. The 
authors argue that fishing is an occupation that can be characterized as active, and ad-
venturous, which satisfies the needs of the person. This explains the extent to which 
fishermen are willing to give it up for alternative professions (Bavinck et al., 2012). 
Thereby fishing being a satisfactory occupation, fishermen tend to be more produc-
tive, creative and committed to this activity (Syptak et al., 1999). 
Regarding the distance to urban market buyers, control variables exhibit no 
significantly higher income over those communities located further from Almidon. 
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This is because fishermen inhabiting isolated communities are subject to the 
bargaining power of local buyers and face mortality risks of the fish. Particularly, 
the estimation signs for Yuri and Playa Blanca are negative, though non-significant, 
corresponding to that of the furthest communities.
4.3. Livelihoods diversification in IFC
Considering that diversification focuses on different income sources and their 
relationship to income levels (Ellis, 1998), non-fishing earnings to on-fishing earn-
ings can be compared. For analyzing this, a dummy variable di is created taking the 
value 1 when more than 50 % of a fisherman’s income is obtained from activities 
other than fishing. On the other hand, it takes value 0 when 50 % or less of income 
is obtained from other activities, i.e. when a fisherman relies 50 % or more for his 
livelihood on fishing. This is an approximation to diversification behavior. A probit 
model is estimated considering di as a dependent variable and some socio-economic 
characteristics as independent variables.
TABLE 7
Determinants of diversification in IFC
Variable Description Coefficient dy/dx
dhs* High-schooled fishermen 0.727* (0.398) 0.244* (0.131)
ph Household size 0.110 (0.085) 0.038 (0.029)
cs Civil status 0.360 (0.551) 0.116 (0.165)
tv Television ownership 0.063 (0.406) 0.022 (0.140)
ow* Vessel ownership -0.746* (0.446) -0.272* (0.165)
Constant  -1.249 (0.848)
a Dummy of diversification di as dependent variable. Pseudo R2= 0.1028, Prob > Chi2 = 0.241, n = 45.
*Significance at 10 %. **Significance at 5 %. ***Significance at 1 %.
Source: Own elaboration. 
In this analysis it is observed that those more-schooled fishermen have more 
probability to diversify than those that only have basic schooling. This confirms, as 
Ellis (1998; 2000) and Vedeld et al. (2012) argue, that in IFC the lack of education 
is a constraint inhibiting diversification and development of alternative activities for 
securing livelihoods. It limits inhabitants to depend on ornamental fishing.
Interestingly Ellis (2000) argues that diversification allows actors to reduce the risk 
involved in the seasonality of activities, i.e. fishing. In this case, those more-schooled 
fishermen exhibit this behavior, which entails a strategy for reducing risk represented 
by a smaller probability of income failure. Thereby off-fishing revenues are considered 
as complementary revenues, sometimes representing higher average incomes.
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Moreover, owners of vessels tend to diversify less. We consider this reason-
able considering the explicit opportunity cost involved in this activity. It is notable 
that, neither belonging to a big household, being head of household, nor the level of 
wealth have any statistical influence on diversifying livelihoods in IFC.
5. Discussion and final remarks
5.1. Discussion
This research focuses on the analysis of the income of fishermen in their main 
activity and the possible alternative activities without considering the exploitation 
costs. Nevertheless it considers the lower opportunity cost compared to other ac-
tivities (Copes, 1989; Ikiara and Odink, 2000; Doulman, 2004). Open access equi-
librium, sustainable yield, or overexploitation outcomes related to common-pool 
resource management are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, the under-
standing of strategies for secure sustainable livelihoods does not necessarily require 
exhaustive analysis about the evolution of labor dynamics in fishing. The results al-
low judgment that reducing extractive effort applied to the fishing resource proposed 
by the CARF is not enough to ensure effective management of the ornamental fishery 
and sufficient social support for fishermen in their struggle for survival and for im-
proving their standards of living.
According to Smith (1979), households intensify efforts and pressure on fishing 
due to the lack of opportunities in the rural sector leading to overexploitation of 
resources and reduction of incomes, even though the conventional wisdom of 
common-pool resources findings states that open access is the mechanism that leads 
to the overexploitation of the resource (Hardin, 1968; Pearce, 1982). This may be 
due to fishing effort efficiency that seeks rent-maximizing equilibrium for offsetting 
capital investment (Gordon, 1954), regardless the lack of alternative opportunities. 
Additionally, Smith (1979) argues that as long as the resource remains open-
access, long-term solutions to the dual problem of overexploitation of the resource 
and low fishing incomes lie outside the fishing sector in the form of alternative or 
supplementary income sources.
Furthermore, it is necessary to recognize that the improvement of fishermen’s 
income is one of the objectives that authorities such as AUNAP pursue. Nevertheless 
fishing development is a multi-objective activity where it is necessary to adopt 
specific labor market supply-side measures to ensure that the value of fishermen 
is improved. This may be achieved through demand-side measures in communities 
by promoting investment and providing alternative employment opportunities 
(Cunningham, 1993).
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5.2. Conclusions 
There is evidence to state that the lack of alternative income opportunities in 
the IFC leads inhabitants to rely for their livelihoods on fishing (Smith, 1979; Ellis, 
2000; Vedeld et al., 2012), and for obtaining higher incomes. The non-significant 
relationship of effort f on fishermen’s income allows us to consider that reducing 
access to natural capital not necessarily brings a direct decrease of the income of 
fishermen. However because fishing provides higher incomes, fishermen have 
monetary incentives to remain in the activity because supplementary activities are 
less profitable than ornamental fishing.
Owners of vessels perceive their activity in a businesslike way and are subject 
to higher opportunity costs that require to be recompensed. Transport technology 
allows fishermen to travel longer distances and find less exploited fishing zones, thus 
obtaining more species for sale. 
Moreover, those fishermen who perform the activity as a principal one have 
a higher bargaining power, by providing consistent and healthier species to local 
buyers. Besides, fishing being a satisfactory occupation, fishermen tend to be more 
productive, creative and committed to this activity, thereby ensuring higher payments 
for the commodity and thus higher incomes.
Finally, regarding distance to urban markets, though it is not statistically signifi-
cant, it exhibits evidence that isolation provides lower income to inhabitants of IFC. 
This is because fishermen living in isolated communities are subject to local buyers 
bargaining power. 
5.3. The importance of education in IFC
Several studies concur that education is a great facilitator of livelihood 
diversification, and somehow, the lack of education constrains finding alternative 
means for obtaining income. Thereby, less educated agents are more dependent on 
income obtained from the natural environment, i.e. fishing. Besides, lower education 
levels are often found to correlate to fewer available income alternatives (Vedeld et 
al., 2012).
In this research, findings indicate that the increase of incomes related to higher 
schooling is not necessarily related to human capital accumulation and the substitution 
of effort in fishing with other activities that promote economic growth. According 
to Gylfason (2001), a population involved in exploitation of natural resources 
fully relies on the revenues obtained from these activities. Nevertheless, schooling 
provides information to fishermen for perceiving opportunities and opportunity 
costs involved in the activity, the risk involved in the activities, and the strategies for 
securing their livelihoods (Ellis, 1998; 2000). 
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5.4. Policy implications and recommendations
Although there is no understanding whether impacts of CARF will impose con-
straints or offer economic opportunities, it has been argued that these programs fre-
quently lead to sub-optimal results, especially when populations face a limited set of 
opportunities for diversifying livelihoods. 
However, protection of wildlife and the physical environment should not be seen 
as a critical constraint for poverty alleviation and creation of protected areas should 
not be expected to increase poverty. Instead of this, conservation strategies should 
be used as a means to sustain the environment and the resources within it (Adams et 
al., 2004). Thus, the CARF can be an effective policy to manage the resource in the 
short run. Nevertheless, the entitlements provided by these agreements should in-
clude investments outside of the fishery sector to enhance the set of opportunities in 
education, sanitation, communication, transportation, and supplementary livelihood 
activities in order to strengthen the income of small-scale fishermen (Cunningham, 
1993; Vedeld et al., 2012); thus, ensuring a form of community development will 
happen, including a reduction of their vulnerabilities (Bailey and Jentoft, 1990; Béné 
and Friend, 2009; Kraan, 2009).
Appendix 
A.1. Test for normality of error term
The test for normality exhibits evidence that errors are not distributed normally. 
However, considering 90 observations we can apply the Central Limit Theorem, 
allowing us to assume that a large and ramdom sample approaches normality regard-
less the shape of the population distribution.
TABLE A1
Test for normality
Variable n p- value (Skewness)
p-value 
(Kurtosis)
Joint
chi2 (2) Prob > chi2
errors 90 0.0425 0.4329 4.75 0.0932
Source: Own elaboration.
However, the histogram of distribution of errors shows no large deviation from a 
normal distribution.
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FIGURE A1
Distribution of errors
 
Source: Own elaboration.
A.2. Test for heteroskedasticity
Breush-Pagan test exhibits evidence of heteroskedasticity. For correcting this, we 
ran a regression controlling by clustering variable id, which means each fisherman. 
Then we corrected this problem in the regression.
TABLE A2
Breush-Pagan test
Breush-Pagan
chi2(1) 3.5900
p-value (BP) 0.0581
Source: Own elaboration.
A.3. Test for Multicollinearity
Correlation between variables exhibits evidence of multicollinearity between ef-
fort applied to fishing (f) and fishing as a principal activity (fpa), which seems cred-
ible given that fishermen who perform the activity as a principal one are more active 
on it. However, given that these variable are objective of theoretical and empirical 
analysis, we decided to estimate the effect on income separately. 
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TABLE A3
Correlation matrix of variables
 f oa r ow dhs cs fpa
Effort on fishing f 1
Effort on other activities oa -0.8463 1
Row boats r 0.0444 0.0863 1
Vessel ownership ow 0.0570 0.0940 0.7783 1
High-school experience dhs 0.0131 -0.0184 0.0898 0.1900 1
Civil Status cs -0.0206 -0.0302 -0.1551 -0.1961 -0.2450 1
Fishing as principal activity fpa 0.7792 -0.6535 0.3145 0.2686 -0.0031 -0.0928 1
Source: Own elaboration.
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